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ABSTRACT 
The Fleet Response Plan was developed to provide persistent readiness of the 
carrier fleet to respond to a variety of situations.  This capability is developed through the 
Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) where the Navy’s carriers are scheduled in 
staggered 32-month cycles consisting of four phases of progressive readiness levels.  
Required operating target funds, or OPTAR, are budgeted to each carrier by Commander 
Naval Air Forces to achieve and maintain that readiness.  Future OPTAR budgets, 
however, will be constrained by a 20-percent reduction in fiscal years 2009 through 2013.  
To compensate, funding priority is given to carriers in higher readiness phases at the 
expense of carriers conducting baseline training and maintenance, adversely impacting 
the fleet’s ability to exercise the Fleet Response Plan as originally intended.  This thesis 
optimizes scheduling synchronously across all carriers to meet established FRTP 
readiness goals.  Then, using a cost model based on recent historical spending and 
employment data, this thesis generates an estimate of required funding to operate all 
carriers.  Ultimately, this thesis provides a link between operational requirements and 
OPTAR budget requirements. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Fleet Response Plan calls for the availability of six carriers within 30 days 
and an additional carrier within 90 days.  This capability is developed through the Fleet 
Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) where the Navy’s eleven aircraft carriers are scheduled 
in staggered 32-month cycles consisting of four phases: basic (unit level training), 
integrated, sustainment, and maintenance.  Current policy modifies the FRTP readiness 
goal to “3+3+1+3” broken down as follows: six total carriers (3 deployed + 3 others) in 
sustainment provide the 30-day response; one carrier in basic or integrated (+1) provides 
the 90-day response; and three carriers in maintenance (+3) with an additional carrier on 
overhaul.  Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF), as the air Type Commander, is 
responsible to the fleet for the carriers’ readiness during each phase, and budgets each 
ship’s operating funds to achieve and maintain that readiness. 
All ships, squadrons, and other units receive their annual operating funds from 
their Type Commander in the form of an Operating Target (OPTAR) that can be 
considered an annual budget.  These operating funds are defined generally as an estimate 
of the amount of budget authority required to operate a ship to support organizational 
maintenance and to purchase repair parts and general supplies.  Operating Target funds 
derive from the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) account appropriated every 
year by Congress and are budgeted to the Type Commanders by Fleet Forces Command. 
Increased operational tempo by the carriers during Operation Enduring Freedom 
and Operation Iraq Freedom led to higher than expected OPTAR spending.  In recent 
years, CNAF received additional funding as part of larger Department of Defense 
supplemental funding to cover the increased cost of operations associated with the global 
war on terror.  Future OPTAR budgets, however, will be constrained by a 20 percent 
reduction to the ship operations account that funds OPTAR in fiscal years 2009 though 
2013.  When forecast OPTAR costs exceed what is provided, CNAF gives highest 
funding priority to carriers in sustainment phase.  To satisfy the higher spending required 
by ships in sustainment, CNAF harvests funding from carriers in basic and maintenance 
 xvi
phase.  Reduced OPTAR funding during these phases, however, adversely impacts the 
fleet’s ability to exercise the Fleet Response Plan as originally intended. 
As an alternative, we will explore whether the scheduled Fleet Response Training 
Plan phases can be stretched or contracted synchronously across all carriers to meet 
operational commitments without sacrificing baseline maintenance and training, and 
ultimately produce an estimate of required funding to operate all carriers.  The first step 
of the analysis will be to derive a statistically sound estimator of future spending based 
on recent historical data.  Then we will determine if the scheduled phases can be adjusted 
to meet the “3+3+1+3” readiness goal.  Finally, once we generate an optimal schedule we 
will propose a realistic profile of required OPTAR funding levels. 
We ultimately discover that the FRTP goal of “3+3+1+3” is not achievable given 
the current force structure and projected funding levels.  However, we demonstrate that 
both operational and maintenance planners can benefit from long-range, synchronous 
planning of all the FRTP phases to produce the readiness posture required by the Fleet 
Response Plan.  Additionally, we present a feature to estimate carrier fleet spending to 
provide a link between operational readiness and budget requirements. 
 xvii
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1. Fleet Response Plan 
The Carrier Strike Group is the cornerstone of United States naval power.  In the 
past, carriers and other units of their battle group trained for deployment to areas around 
the world using the traditional Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC).  Following a 
shipyard maintenance period, units progressed through escalating levels of unit and 
multi-unit training culminating in deployment with a battle group.  However, this 
typically produced a “bath tub” effect following deployment as ships entered 
maintenance periods and wholesale crew turnover severely degraded unit readiness. 
Today, Combatant Commanders need a more agile and flexible Navy to respond 
to emergent requirements.  The global war on terror requires better planning to ensure 
trained Navy forces are available to surge on short notice, a capability not possible under 
the IDTC.  The Navy developed the Fleet Response Plan to deliver that capability, while 
continuing to provide rotationally deployed forces to areas around the world.   
The Fleet Response Plan, and its associated Fleet Readiness Training Plan 
(FRTP), consists of four phases (basic, integrated, sustainment, and maintenance) 
designed to ensure naval forces are trained and certified in progressive levels of 
employability.  An FRTP cycle begins at the completion of a maintenance phase, and 
continues through the end of the following maintenance phase and is typically 32 months 
long.   The manning level and training requirements of each carrier are tailored to achieve 
the appropriate proficiency and mission readiness targets at the beginning of each FRTP 
phase.  The following definitions are summarized from the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan 
instruction [OPNAV 2006]: 
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a. Basic Phase (Unit-Level Training) 
The basic phase is the first in an FRTP cycle and focuses on Type 
Commander (TYCOM) unit-level training.  A unit completes basic phase after meeting 
TYCOM certification criteria, which for an aircraft carrier occurs upon successful 
completion of the Final Evaluation Period (FEP).  Aircraft carriers successfully 
completing basic phase are designated as Independent Unit Ready for Tasking, and may 
be tasked with independent operations in support of Homeland Security, Humanitarian 
Assistance or Disaster Relief, or other specific operations.  Units in basic phase are 
considered able to deploy within 90 days of receipt of orders. 
b. Integrated Phase 
Training in the integrated phase is designed to organize units and staffs 
into coordinated strike groups capable of operating in multi-dimensional warfare.  Units 
completing integrated phase are designated either Maritime Security Surge (MSS), Major 
Combat Operations Surge (MCO-S), or Major Combat Operations Ready (MCO-R).  
Units classified MCO-S have demonstrated the capability to function as part of a naval 
combat force, whereas units classified as MCO-R are certified as fully capable of 
conducting all forward-deployed operations and have demonstrated the ability to lead 
joint and coalition forces.  Aircraft carriers typically achieve MCO-S following 
successful completion of a Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) and later 
MCO-R status following completion of Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX). 
c. Sustainment Phase 
The sustainment phase follows the integrated one and continues through 
the post-deployment period until commencement of the maintenance phase.  The 
sustainment phase now provides a longer period of time during which a ship is 
employable than was typically the case under the former IDTC.  Units maintain war 
fighting readiness through group, unit, or multi-unit exercises and will typically deploy in 
support of Combatant Commander requirements.  Units in sustainment phase are 
considered able to deploy within 30 days upon receipt of orders. 
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d. Maintenance Phase 
The maintenance phase is a critical part of the FRTP where major depot-
level repairs, upgrades and modernizations are accomplished.  Depot level maintenance 
for Atlantic Fleet carriers is provided by Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding in Newport 
News, Virginia, or Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia, and for Pacific Fleet 
carriers by Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington.  The Ship Repair 
Facility in Yokosuka, Japan, provides depot level maintenance for the Forward Deployed 
Naval Force carrier, currently USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63).  Northrop Grumman 
Shipbuilding also provides mid-life refueling for all nuclear powered aircraft carriers 
[OPNAV 2006]. 
2. Fleet Response Plan in Practice 
The Fleet Response Plan was tested for the first time in 2004 when seven aircraft 
carriers were simultaneously underway between June and August of that year.  The 
carriers USS George Washington, USS John C. Stennis, and USS Kitty Hawk were on 
scheduled deployments around the globe.  In addition, USS John F. Kennedy, USS 
Enterprise, and USS Harry S. Truman were underway conducting joint and international 
training exercises.  The USS Ronald Reagan was also underway conducting operations in 
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility during her 
inter-fleet transfer from Norfolk, Virginia, to San Diego, California.   
3. Current Operations 
The original goal of the Fleet Response Plan, when it was introduced in 2003, was 
to maintain a “6+2” readiness posture of Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs).  This concept 
promised six CSGs available for employment within 30 days and an additional two CSGs 
available for employment within 90 days [OPNAV 2003].  The first six carriers were drawn 
from those that achieved MSS, MCO-S, or MCO-R during the integrated phase, and those 
currently in sustainment phase.  The two 90-day carriers were to be drawn from those in 
basic or integrated phase. 
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Current policy from CNAF modifies the FRTP readiness goal to “3+3+1+3” 
broken down as follows: six total carriers (3 deployed + 3 others) in sustainment phase; 
one carrier in basic or integrated (+1); and three carriers in maintenance (+3).  The 
Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) carrier in Yokosuka, Japan, is always considered 
one of the six in sustainment unless she is in scheduled depot maintenance.  An additional 
carrier is always conducting a 3-year midlife Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) 
and is not included in the FRTP readiness goal.  Figure 1 shows a notional FRTP cycle 
with each phase’s approximate length [OPNAV 2006]. 
 
Figure 1.   Notional 32-Month FRTP Cycle 
4. Operating Target (OPTAR) Defined 
All U.S. ships, squadrons, and other units receive their annual operating funds 
from their Type Commander (TYCOM) in the form of an Operating Target (OPTAR) 
that can be considered an annual budget.  These operating funds are defined generally as 
an estimate of the amount of budget authority required to operate a ship to support 
organizational maintenance and to purchase repair parts and general supplies 
[Department of the Navy 1990].  Other operating expenses by ships such as fuel, payroll 
and food costs are funded separately from OPTAR.  Operating Target funds derive from 
the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) account appropriated every year by 
Congress.  Specifically, Operating Target funds are budgeted under line 1B1B-Mission 
and Other Ship Operations of the O&MN account, and are divided amongst the aviation, 
surface, and submarine Type Commanders by Fleet Forces Command.  The TYCOM 
then provides each unit under his command an OPTAR using TYCOM-specific business 
rules.  Aircraft carriers fall under the administrative command of the aviation TYCOM, 
Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) in San Diego, California.  Table 1 displays the 
actual total CNAF OPTAR spending for fiscal years 2003 through 2007, and the 
Basic Integrated Sustainment Maint 
4 months 3 months 6 months 19 months 
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projected OPTAR budgets for fiscal years 2008 and 2009.  Converting all amounts to 
constant-year dollars, and dividing by the number of active carriers each year gives an 














2003 355,044 430,420 12 35,868 
2004 210,574 246,919 12 20,577 
2005 235,912 265,684 12 22,140 
2006 189,095 201,140 12 16,762 
2007 246,362 255,231 11 23,203 
2008 141,810 143,980 11 13,089 
2009 134,579 133,664 11 12,151 
Table 1.   CNAF OPTAR Spending by Fiscal Year 
5. Ship Operations Pressurization 
The amount to budget for Mission and Other Ship Operations funding every year 
is derived from a mathematical formula called the Ship Ops Model [Gantt 2003] that 
calculates a 2-year moving average of historical costs.  While preparing the budget for 
Program Review 2009, Ship Operations resource sponsors in the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness Division (N43) challenged the amount estimated by 
the Ship Ops Model and proposed a cut in OPTAR funding in favor of other budget 
objectives.  Fleet Forces Command and the Type Commanders, given the opportunity to 
justify the Ship Ops Model estimate, were only able to defend approximately 80% of 
historical certified obligations.  As a result, N43 proposed a 20% cut, or approximately 
$162M, from the Mission and Other Ship Operations account to be applied in fiscal year  
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2009.  Ultimately, the 20% “pressurization” was applied across the Future Year Defense 
Plan affecting fiscal years 2009 through 2013, amounting to approximately $861M in 
total budget reductions [Maldonado 2007]. 
B. PREVIOUS WORK ON AIRCRAFT CARRIER SCHEDULING 
Given the aircraft carrier’s importance in U.S. military strategy, numerous studies 
in the last decade analyze the problem of optimal aircraft carrier scheduling.  In a study 
requested by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirement 
and Assessment) N-8, Brown, et.al [1997] analyzed the role of forward-deployed naval 
forces in U.S. national security strategy and joint military strategy.  Three major issues 
were studied: 
• The strategic value of forward-deployed naval forces within predominantly 
diffuse, relatively low-level threats, and with crises that are difficult or 
impossible to anticipate; 
• The economic benefits of forward-deployed naval forces, as illustrated by the 
impact of naval crisis response on oil futures’ prices during three previous 
crises in the Persian Gulf; and 
• The effectiveness of naval forces at providing forward presence, as measured 
by the amount of coverage or carrier presence in forward areas and by the 
response times of carriers to widely-dispersed locations throughout the world 
[Brown, et. al 1997, p. i]. 
The study relies on the Coverage and Response Estimation (CoRE) model, an 
optimization model that estimates coverage and response times achievable by the number 
of carriers in the Navy.  At the time of the study the Navy had twelve active carriers, and 
the study concluded that a twelve-carrier force could achieve 65% and 70% coverage to 
European Command and Central Command areas of responsibility, respectively, during 
the period of 1997 to 2006. 
Ayik [1998] extended the CoRE model to include scheduling aircraft carrier depot 
level maintenance periods and deployments synchronously.  That study concluded 15% 
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more coverage to EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM AORs could be achieved by 
shifting maintenance periods by 1 month allowed by Department of Navy policy. 
Aircraft carrier employment changed with the advent of the Fleet Response Plan.  
Hall [2004] investigates the personnel preparedness and maintenance factors that 
constrain the carrier force’s ability to meet requirements and the effect of depot-level 
maintenance under the Fleet Response Plan.  He models various scenarios varying Fleet 
Response Plan training schedules from 21 to 27 months and their impact on meeting the 
“6+2” readiness goal.  His analysis generates potential schedules as columns in a set 
partitioning problem, and selects the “best” using a time-indexed, monthly resolution 
optimization model.  Hall concludes that with current personnel and maintenance 
constraints, we cannot maintain the “6+2” Fleet Response Plan goal with the current 
force.  He offers alternatives by extending the employable portion of a carrier’s FRTP 
cycle or reducing the requirement to “5+2” and the associated effects of these potential 
policy changes. 
In a study for the Assessments Division of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (OPNAV N81), the RAND National 
Defense Research Institute examined the feasibility and implications of increasing 
aircraft carrier forward presence by proposing alternative lengths between depot 
maintenance periods.  In the study Yardley et.al [2008] analyze the impact of a shorter 
cycle lasting 18-24 months consisting of one deployment, or a longer cycle lasting up to 
42 months that could accommodate two deployments.  The latter was of particular 
interest to N81, permitting a carrier to perform two deployments between major depot 
availabilities.  The study concluded that the longer cycle increases the carrier fleet’s 
forward presence and ability to meet a “6+1” Fleet Response Plan goal, but the increased 
operational tempo may adversely affect the Navy’s ability to meet maintenance demands. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The full impact of reduced OPTAR funding on the carrier fleet as a result of the 
ship operations account pressurization is unknown.  However, Commander Naval Air 
Forces fears he will not be able to meet the “3+3+1+3” Fleet Response Plan goal in fiscal 
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year 2009 and beyond.  In the past, when increased operational tempo during Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom led to higher than expected OPTAR spending, 
CNAF received additional OPTAR funding authority as part of larger Department of 
Defense supplemental funding to cover the increased cost of operations.  The future 
availability of these “Cost of War” supplementals, however, is in doubt, putting 
additional funding pressure on the carrier fleet.  When forecast OPTAR costs exceed 
what is provided, CNAF gives highest funding priority to carriers in sustainment phase.  
To satisfy the higher spending required by ships in sustainment, CNAF harvests funding 
from carriers in basic, integrated and maintenance phase.  Reduced OPTAR funding 
during these phases, however, adversely impacts the fleet’s ability to execute the Fleet 
Response Plan as originally intended. 
As an alternative, we will explore whether the scheduled Fleet Response Training 
Plan phases can be stretched or contracted synchronously across all carriers to meet 
operational commitments without sacrificing baseline maintenance and training, and 
ultimately produce an estimate of required funding to operate all carriers.  The first step 
of the analysis will be to derive a statistically sound estimator of future spending based 
on recent historical data.  Then we will determine if the scheduled phases can be adjusted 
to meet the “3+3+1+3” readiness goal.  Finally, once we generate an optimal schedule we 
will propose a realistic profile of required OPTAR funding levels. 
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II. DATA ANALYSIS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIER SCHEDULING 
FACTORS 
A. DATA GATHERING AND ORGANIZATION 
Our analysis of historical OPTAR spending and employment data focuses on the 
period from fiscal year 2003, the first year of the Fleet Response Plan, through fiscal year 
2007, the last full fiscal year prior to this research.  Several sources were considered for 
spending data, however, the monthly Budget OPTAR reports submitted by the ships is 
the most readily available source providing the fidelity we seek. 
1. Aircraft Carrier Operating Target (OPTAR) Data 
All units that receive an OPTAR are required to submit a monthly Budget 
OPTAR Report (BOR) to their Type Commander documenting all obligations against the 
ship operations account for the month.  The Ship Operations program manager at 
Commander Naval Air Forces maintains a database of these monthly reports for all 
aircraft carriers, which provides the spending data we need. 
The Budget OPTAR Report is a report of obligations, which differ from 
expenditures in the Navy accounting system.  This can be an important, and complicating 
distinction.  An obligation, according to Navy comptroller instruction, is a “request 
document for material or services,” made by the ship to be paid for from the Ship 
Operations funds held by the TYCOM [NAVSO P-3013-2, App I-7].  An expenditure is 
defined as “a disbursement or payment of appropriated funds,” that occurs when the 
supply system issues material or a disbursing officer makes a payment [NAVSO P-3013-
2, App I-3].  In short, money is not “spent” from the Ship Operations account until the 
obligation and expenditure document are electronically matched in the Navy accounting 
system.  Discrepancies can occur when the obligation value transmitted by the ship does 
not match the expenditure transmitted from the supply system.  In practice, however, 
these discrepancies are transmitted electronically to the carriers and adjustments are 
reconciled daily to ensure the ship has the most current information, especially before a 
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Budget OPTAR Report is generated and sent to the Type Commander.  As a result, the 
Budget OPTAR Reports are assumed to be the most accurate source available of monthly 
aircraft carrier spending. 
The operating target data is normalized to constant year dollars based on fiscal 
year 2009 using the Operations & Maintenance, Navy-Composite index provided by the 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis.  The indices used are listed in Table 2. 
 






Table 2.   O&MN-Composite Inflation Indices 
2. Aircraft Carrier Employment Data 
Commander Naval Air Forces provided an unclassified past, current, and future 
carrier schedule for our analysis.  The detailed schedules were translated into monthly 
periods of the four FRTP phases according to the following phase transitions established 
by CNAF policy: 
• Basic phase begins immediately following completion of the prior 
maintenance period and lasts until the completion of Final Evaluation 
Problem (FEP).  Representing the culmination of unit level training, FEP 
evaluates the ship’s ability to conduct combat missions, support functions, 
and survive complex casualty control situations; 
• Integrated phase follows basic and lasts until completion of the Composite 
Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX).  This exercise is focused on 
 11
developing the carrier and air wing into a cohesive unit, and integrating 
them with other units assigned to the deploying Carrier Strike Group; 
• Sustainment phase follows integrated and lasts until the beginning of the 
ship’s next depot level maintenance period; and 
• Maintenance phase concludes at the commencement of sea trials, which 
are conducted after all depot maintenance availabilities [CNAF 2005]. 
When transitions occur mid-month the month is classified according to which phase 
spans the majority of the month based on the criteria above.  For example, if a carrier 
completed its Final Evaluation Problem on January 20, 2008, then January 2008 would 
be classified as a basic phase month for that carrier.  Conversely, if the carrier completed 
FEP on January 10, 2008, then the month would be classified as an integrated phase 
month.  On the rare occasion that a transition event concluded on the 15th day of a 30-day 
month (or the 14th of February), that month is be classified according to the upcoming 
phase.  Applying the criteria mentioned above to USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) 
provides an example of one complete FRTP cycle and the transitions between phases (see 
Figure 2). 
 










(13 Oct 04 – 17 Apr 05)
Sea Trials 
(21 Dec 06)
FRTP Cycle (35 mths)
Maint. Basic
 
Figure 2.   FRTP Example for USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) 
B. OPERATING TARGET COST MODEL 
Commander Naval Air Forces provides each carrier with its OPTAR budget based 
on a three-year historical average of actual obligations by FRTP phase and by coast 
(Pacific and Atlantic).  These averages are then applied to the upcoming year’s schedule 
to produce each ship’s budget amount.   
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A linear regression analysis of monthly historical aircraft carrier Operating Target 
spending and employment factors is used to generate a cost model for future spending by 
carrier in each FRTP Phase.  Assuming that varying the duration of a FRTP phase 
influences its OPTAR cost, we seek a cost model that relies on prescriptive explanatory 
variables we can adjust.  First, the monthly OPTAR and employment data have been 
aggregated into observations of complete FRTP phases, with total OPTAR obligations for 
the phase as the dependent variable and the following independent variables: 
• Length – the length of the FRTP phase in months; 
• Fleet – a categorical variable representing the parent fleet of the carrier 
[Atlantic or Pacific]; and 
• FRTP_Phase – a categorical variable representing the FRTP phase [basic, 
integrated, sustainment, maintenance]. 
The resulting regression produces the equation in Figure 3 that predicts total 
OPTAR cost for the given FRTP phase in constant year 2009 dollars.  The intercept 
($2,791,729) establishes a starting point for phase cost.  The coefficients for the two 
levels of Fleet indicate that Atlantic fleet ships cost more than Pacific fleet ships.  The 
coefficients for the four levels of FRTP_Phase indicate that integrated, maintenance, and 
basic phases (in ascending order) incur less OPTAR cost than sustainment phase.  The 
positive coefficient for Length adds $1,456,617 for each month in the phase.  All cost 
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Figure 3.   Total OPTAR Obligation per FRTP Phase Cost Model Equation 
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Complete model statistics are included in Appendix A.  The test for significance 
of regression (F test) for this model has a p-value of less than 0.0001, indicating a strong 
linear relationship exists between the response (total phase OPTAR obligation) and at 
least one of the predictor variables.  The model’s coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.86 
indicating 86% of the variability of the response variable (total phase OPTAR obligation) 
is explained by the model.  This is a good fit. 
C. AIRCRAFT CARRIER SCHEDULING FACTORS 
The scheduling of carriers to meet the Fleet Response Plan readiness goal is 
impacted by the following factors: i) number of available ships; ii) depot level 
maintenance; iii) personnel tempo restrictions; and iv) annual OPTAR budget. 
1. Number of Available Ships 
The Navy currently has 11 aircraft carriers split between Pacific and Atlantic 
Fleets as shown in Table 3.  The carrier fleet will be reduced to 10 active ships following 
the decommissioning of USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) in October 2008.  The next carrier 
scheduled for decommissioning is USS Enterprise (CVN 65) sometime in fiscal year 
2013.  The Navy’s newest carrier, USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77), will be delivered 
in November 2008.  The USS George Washington (CVN 73) will relieve USS Kitty 
Hawk as the Forward Deployed Naval Force carrier in Yokosuka, Japan, in July 2008.  In 
addition, USS Carl Vinson will return to San Diego, California, after completing its 
Refueling Complex Overhaul at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding in late 2009. 
2. Depot Level Maintenance 
The Fleet Maintenance Board of Directors (FMBOD) administers aircraft carrier 
depot maintenance, and its members represent Naval Sea Systems Command, the Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations (N4), Fleet Commanders, Type Commanders, and the various 
shipyards.  The current aircraft carrier depot maintenance schedule showing the planned 
maintenance periods for all carriers is coordinated by the carrier maintenance planning 
activity of Naval Sea Systems Command, a snapshot of which is included as Appendix C.  
 14
Changes to the approved schedule are vetted through the FMBOD unless the proposed 
schedule change is less than 35 days in duration or 3% of total cost.  In these cases, 
schedule changes can be approved by the Type Commander [O’Malley 2008]. 
3. Annual OPTAR Budget 
Commander Naval Air Forces receives budget authority for ships’ OPTAR from 
Fleet Forces Command.  The authorized budget amount for fiscal year 2009 is $133.7 










USS Kitty Hawk CV 63 1961 2008 Yokosuka, Japan 
USS Enterprise CVN 65 1961 2013 Norfolk, VA 
USS Nimitz CVN 68 1975 2027 San Diego, CA 
USS Dwight D Eisenhower CVN 69 1977 2029 Norfolk, VA 
USS Carl Vinson CVN 70 1982 2034 Norfolk, VA 
USS Theodore Roosevelt CVN 71 1986 2038 Norfolk, VA 
USS Abraham Lincoln CVN 72 1989 2041 Everett, WA 
USS George Washington CVN 73 1992 2044 Norfolk, VA 
USS John C Stennis CVN 74 1995 2047 Bremerton, WA 
USS Harry S Truman CVN 75 1998 2050 Norfolk, VA 
USS Ronald Reagan CVN 76 2003 2055 San Diego, CA 
USS George H W Bush CVN 77 2008 2060 East Coast 





III. MODEL INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
A. CARRIER FORCE INITIAL STATE 
The number of carriers considered is constant at eleven.  The USS Kitty Hawk 
(CV 63) is eliminated from the planning scenario due to her decommissioning in fall 
2008.  We also assume USS Enterprise (CVN 65) is available until her anticipated 
deactivation period scheduled to begin in December 2012.  The initial phase state of each 
carrier considered is displayed in Table 4.  We include the pre-planning horizon start 







Phase as of First 
Planning Month 
(October 08) 
USS Enterprise (CVN 65) Atlantic April 2008 Maintenance 
USS Nimitz (CVN 68) Pacific June 2008 Maintenance 
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) Atlantic October 2008 Integrated 
USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) Pacific November 2005 Maintenance 
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) Atlantic June 2008 Sustainment 
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) Pacific December 2007 Sustainment 
USS George Washington (CVN 73) Pacific April 2008 Sustainment 
USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) Pacific July 2008 Integrated 
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) Atlantic September 2008 Maintenance 
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) Pacific April 2008 Sustainment 
PCU George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) Atlantic  Maintenance 
Table 4.   Aircraft Carrier Initial State 
B. FLEET READINESS TRAINING PLAN PHASE DURATION 
1. Basic, Integrated and Sustainment Phase 
Navy policy does not enforce a minimum or maximum duration for each phase.  
Basic and integrated phase are, by definition, training periods, and CNAF policy requires 
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certain training evolutions in each to progress from one phase to the next.  The collection 
of training evolutions necessary during basic phase require at least 45 days to complete, 
and the one evolution in integrated phase (COMPTUEX) requires at least 21 days to 
complete [CNAF 2005].  Therefore, we assume a minimum duration for basic and 
integrated phase of two months and one month, respectively.  We also establish a 
minimum duration for sustainment phase of six months to remain consistent with 
personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) regulations [OPNAV 2007a].  Maximum durations for 
basic, integrated, and sustainment phases are set at the maximum observed durations of 







Basic 2 15 
Integrated 1 4 
Sustainment 6 22 
Table 5.   Minimum and Maximum FRTP Phase Durations 
2. Maintenance Phase 
Maintenance phase durations are governed by the aircraft carrier depot 
maintenance schedule promulgated by the carrier maintenance planning activity of Naval 
Sea Systems Command.  A current version of this schedule is included as Appendix C.  
We reduce the actual schedule to show only the major maintenance availabilities we 
define to include: Planned Incremental Availability (PIA); Docking Planned Incremental 
Availability (DPIA); Extended Selected Restricted Availability (ESRA); Extended 
Docking Selected Restricted Availability (EDSRA); Selected Restricted Availability 
(SRA); Post Shakedown Availability (PSA); and Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH).  
We consider the 1-month Carrier Incremental Availabilities (CIA) shown in Appendix C 




maintenance phases that mark the end of an FRTP cycle.  Figure 4 shows the 
simplification of the actual carrier maintenance schedule used as an input for our 
planning purposes. 
 
Ship O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S
CVN 65 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 68 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 69 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 70 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 71 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 72 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 73 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 74 X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 75 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 76 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CVN 77 X X X X X X X X X X X X
FY 2012 (10/11-9/12) FY 2013 (10/12-9/13)FY 2009 (10/08-9/09) FY 2010 (10/09-9/10) FY 2011 (10/10-9/11)
 
Figure 4.   Simplified Carrier Maintenance Schedule. 
In this figure, marked boxes indicate scheduled maintenance periods.  For instance, CVN 
65 begins the planning scenario in maintenance through July 2009.  The schedule shows 
two more maintenance periods for CVN 65 in March through May 2011 and December 
2012 until the end of our planning horizon. 
 
To comply with current maintenance policy, we allow only one-month shifts to 
the start of scheduled maintenance periods (earlier or later), and only for maintenance 
periods exceeding four months in duration, and one-month changes to duration (shorter 
or longer).  Start month or duration months may be changed for maintenance periods 
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Scheduled Maintenance (+ 1 month)
Scheduled Maintenance (base case)
Scheduled Maintenance (- 1 month)
Scheduled Maintenance (base case)
Scheduled Maintenance (base case)
 




This model has monthly fidelity over a 5-year planning horizon.  The model 
begins by assigning each carrier to its initial phase state according to Table 4 then 
schedules the carriers in successive planning months according to allowable phase 
transitions.  The FRTP phases are forced to be followed in order, that is, basic follows 
maintenance, integrated follows basic, etc.  The decision to transition from one phase to 
the next is Markovian in the sense that there is no long-term record-keeping by carrier.  
Each phase transition depends only on the prior phase termination. 
Total phase OPTAR costs are calculated for each scheduled carrier-phase-
duration combination and then amortized over all months in the phase.  The model then 
attempts to minimize overall OPTAR cost imposing a financial penalty to planning 
months where the FRTP goal is not met. 
The model does not have visibility of future deployments.  As a result, we do not 
apply personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) restrictions, and we reduce the “3+3+1+3” goal 
to “6+1+3” (total sustainment + basic or integrated + maintenance) in the formulation.  
The model also has no visibility of maintenance types, and therefore, does not distinguish 
between docked, undocked, or overhaul (RCOH) maintenance phases. 
1. Special Case Considerations 
The carrier forward-based in Japan, USS George Washington, does not follow the 
typical FRTP cycle as it has been defined here.  The FDNF carrier is considered one of 
the sustainment carriers in the “3+3+1+3” readiness goal between its annual depot 
maintenance availabilities.  To accommodate these short cycles, the model forces USS 
George Washington to conduct a 2-month basic phase followed by a 1-month integrated 
phase followed by sustainment phase months until the next scheduled maintenance 
availability. 
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The USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) is assumed to be in basic phase in the 
period following her delivery in November 2008 until the start of her post shakedown 
availability scheduled in March 2009.  This post shakedown availability is assigned to 
newly-built ships to correct defects and discrepancies discovered during the shakedown 
period.  Following that, CVN 77 is considered available for normal scheduling. 
B. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
Index Use [~cardinality] 
c C∈   carrier [~11] 
s S∈   state of carrier [3] 
p P∈   phase of FRTP cycle [4] 
sp P P∈ ⊆  phases of FRTP cycle associated with each state 
m M∈  planning month, alias m’ [60] 
cm M M∈ ⊆  carrier c available planning months [~60] 
pd D∈  admissible durations of phase p [~6]  
y Y∈   planning year [5] 
ym M M∈ ⊆  months in planning year y [12] 
( )y m   year of planning month m 
f F∈   fleet [2] 
 
Data [units] 
'cfpmdmcost  cost of carrier c in fleet f carrying out phase p starting in planning 
month m for duration d months incurred during month m’ [OPTAR 
2009 $] 
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yoptar   OPTAR budget by planning year [OPTAR 2009 $] 
sstate_req  CNAF readiness requirement expressed as number of carriers 
required to be in state s [cardinality] 
 
Variables [units] 
cpmdX  =1 if carrier c is in phase p during months { , 1,..., 1}m m m d+ + − , 
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This model has monthly fidelity over a 5-year planning horizon.  The objective 
function assesses penalty costs for deviations from policy (constraint violations).  For 
simplicity, these are not shown here.  Each constraint (1) requires a carrier to be 
employed in exactly one phase each month.  Each constraint (2) requires that when a 
maintenance period appears with alternate start months and durations, exactly one 
alternative will be selected.  Each constraint (3) requires a minimum number of carriers 
to be in a readiness state each month.  Each constraint (4) specifies for a carrier, phase, 
and month, whether or not a phase transition can take place to the next phase the 
following month.  The notation “++” signifies circular succession in the phase set.  There 
is no such constraint linking ‘sustainment’ to its ordinal successor ‘maintenance’ so that a 
maintenance phase can follow any other one.  Each constraint (5) limits OPTAR 
expenses for some year.  The decision variables (6) are binary. 
1. OPTAR Cost Calculation 
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The mixed integer program model is implemented with the algebraic modeling 
language GAMS and solved using CPLEX version 10 [GAMS 2008]. 
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3. Alternative Model 
A stronger model for this situation would be a large-scale set partition [e.g., Ayik 
1998], with a row for every month-phase, and a column for every alternate schedule each 
carrier could adopt.  Such a model would permit keeping track of the complete history of 
each ship.  However, manually enumerating alternate schedules and/or programming 
automated enumeration is tedious, and is not necessary in the case at hand. 
Our model has about three thousand constraints and 30 thousand binary decision 
variables, and solves to optimality in less than a minute.  
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V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RESULTS 
1. Optimized Schedule 
The optimized schedule output is displayed in Figure 6.  The model’s objective 
function penalizes violations to the sustainment goal more strongly than violations to 
other phase goals.  In this way, the model favors scheduling carriers in sustainment over 
the other phases when competing to meet phase goals.  General inspection of the output 
reveals that the model schedules long sustainment periods, in many cases utilizing the 
maximum sustainment phase duration of 22 months.  We also see examples of total cycle 
lengths greater than the published FRP goal of 32 months resulting from our strict 
adherence to scheduled maintenance policy. 
The optimized schedule does not meet the FRTP phase goal of “6+1+3” in all 
months as we’ve defined this for sustainment, basic-or-integrated, and maintenance 
phase.  The model immediately repairs the violation of policy in the initial state when 
only four ships are in sustainment, but quickly encounters an irreparable policy violation 
in planning month three when USS George Washington (CVN 73) begins a scheduled 
maintenance availability.  The most egregious policy violation occurs in planning month 
29, February 2011, when only 4 carriers are scheduled in sustainment, again during a 
scheduled maintenance period for USS George Washington.  The basic-or-integrated goal 
is never violated. 
A close inspection of the schedule output reveals that the model rescheduled all 
maintenance periods in some way (adjustments to start month, duration or both) except 
for the Post Shakedown Availability for USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) in planning 
month 6.  This suggests that perhaps, given more flexibility, the model might prefer more 
significant adjustments to maintenance periods to meet overall phase goals. 
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Ship 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
CVN65 m m m m m m m m m b b b i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m b b i i i i s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m m m m m
CVN68 m m b b i i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m m m m m m m m m b b i i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
CVN69 i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m b b i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m
CVN70 m m m m m m b b i i m m m m b b b b b i i i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m b b i i s s s s s s
CVN71 s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m b b i s s s s s s s s
CVN72 s s s s s s m m m m m m m m b b b b b b b b b b b b b i i i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m m b
CVN73 s s m m m m b b i s s s s s s s m m m m b b i s s s s s m m m m b b i s s s s s m m m m b b i s s s s s m m m m b b i s
CVN74 i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m b b b i i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m
CVN75 m m m m b b i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m m m m m m m b b i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
CVN76 s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m m b b i i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m m m m m m b b i i s s s s
CVN77 b b b b m m m m m b b b b b i s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s m m m m m m b b b b i i i i s s s s s s s s
Phase 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
Basic / Int.
Sust. 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Maint. 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
b = Basic Phase Month i = Integrated Phase Month s = Sustainment Phase Month m = Maintenance Phase Month
Planning Month
Policy Violations by Planning Month (number indicates total ships in phase)
 
Figure 6.   Optimized Schedule Output 
For instance, CVN 65 begins in maintenance then enters basic phase in July 2009 
(planning month 10), followed by integrated phase in October 2009 (planning month 13) 
and sustainment phase in November 2009 (planning month 14).  CVN 65 enters another 
maintenance period in April 2011 (planning month 31), followed by basic phase in July 
2011 (planning month 34), integrated phase in September 2011 (planning month 36), and 
sustainment phase in January 2012 (planning month 40).  CVN 65 begins its final 
maintenance period in December 2012 (planning month 51).  Violations to the readiness 
goal (1 in basic-or-integrated, 6 in sustainment, and 3 in maintenance) are annotated 
along the bottom, with blank cells indicating the goal has been satisfied. 
 
2. OPTAR Costs 
Our OPTAR cost model provides a linear relationship between total OPTAR cost 
for the phase versus total length of the phase in months.  Recall that the cost model 
chooses coefficients based on phase type and parent fleet of the carrier being estimated.  
The “marginal costs” for phase type and fleet are combined with a “fixed cost” to 
establish a starting point for an increasing line with slope represented by the coefficient 
associated with phase length.   
The optimization model calculates total OPTAR for each carrier-fleet-phase-
duration 4-tuple and amortizes this cost over each month of the scheduled phase.  This 
amortization of costs is displayed in Figure 7.  We see a similar relationship between 
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Atlantic and Pacific fleet ships in basic, integrated, and maintenance phases.  The 
concave curves for Atlantic fleet carriers show unit cost decreases over time, where the 
convex curves for Pacific fleet carriers show unit cost increases over time.  For 
sustainment phase, both fleets’ unit costs decrease over time.  From a scheduling 
perspective, these curves indicate we can profit by scheduling 1-month basic and 
integrated phases for Pacific fleet ships.  We can also conclude that short phases of any 
type for Atlantic fleet carriers are extremely expensive. 
















































































































































Figure 7.   Amortized Monthly OPTAR Cost Curves by FRTP Phase 
The graphs show the amortized monthly OPTAR cost for each phase as a function of 
phase duration.  Each curve represents the total phase OPTAR cost divided by the length 
of the phase in months.  For example, the graph in the upper left shows the unit cost for 
an Atlantic fleet carrier in a 1-month basic phase is $5.6M (FY09$) then decreases to 
$3.5M (FY09$) for a 2-month basic phase.  Conversely, the unit cost for a Pacific fleet 
carrier in a 1-month basic phase is $72K (FY09$) and increases to $764K (FY09$) for a 
2-month basic phase. 
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Based on our cost estimates, the optimal schedule violates the given annual 
budget of $133.7M (FY09) by no less than 80% in each planning year (see Figure 8).  
Strict enforcement of the FRTP readiness goal obviously drives up cost, especially in the 
case of the forward-deployed carrier, USS George Washington, which is forced to 
progress into sustainment phase between annually-scheduled maintenance periods. 
 
 
Figure 8.   OPTAR Budget Violations by Fiscal Year 
This graph shows the total OPTAR spent according to cost estimates and the schedule 
generated by the optimization model for each fiscal in our planning horizon.  For 
instance, in fiscal year 2009 we project an additional $121.6M (FY09$) over the budget 
of $133.7M (FY09$) for a total OPTAR cost of $255.3M (FY09$). 
 
To determine the impact of our monthly cost interpretation, we run the model 
again, this time capping the OPTAR charged per month to the overall fleet averages in 
each phase.  These maximums temper the effect of the amortized OPTAR cost on short 
FRTP phases, especially those by Atlantic fleet ships.  The results show the OPTAR 
budget is still exceeded, but there is a decrease in overall OPTAR violations to 40% to 




Figure 9.   Capped OPTAR Budget Violations by Fiscal Year 
This graph shows the total OPTAR spent according to cost estimates and the schedule 
generated by the optimization model for each fiscal in our planning horizon.  In this case, 
we limit monthly OPTAR charged by our cost model to the fleet average per month in 
each phase.  For instance, in fiscal year 2009 we project an additional $57.3M (FY09$) 
over the budget of $133.7M (FY09$) for a total OPTAR cost of $191.0M (FY09$). 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Assuming that recent history is an accurate indicator of the immediate future, we 
discover that the FRTP goal of “3+3+1+3” is not achievable given the current force 
structure and projected funding levels.  We began with an analysis of recent historical 
cost and employment data producing a cost estimating relationship to predict future 
spending by the aircraft carriers.  The passive, descriptive cost model estimates OPTAR 
spending solely on the parent fleet of the carrier and duration of time spent in each of the 
four FRTP phase types.  The results clearly indicate there is something hidden from view 
regarding the estimation of aircraft carrier spending habits.  This invites more 
investigation to develop a stronger cost estimating relationship. 
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A supplementary, descriptive analysis of historical costs by the carriers is 
included in Appendix C.  In that analysis, we attempt to characterize OPTAR spending 
by the carriers using many different factors such as days underway, number of port visits, 
the occurrence of major inspections, etc., details not visible to our primary analysis.  The 
relevant conclusion from that analysis is that the data collected does not sufficiently 
explain all the variability in OPTAR spending across the carrier fleet. 
This research ultimately proves, however, that a relatively simple optimization 
model provides valuable insight into this type of problem.  Previous studies show the 
utility of long-term depot maintenance scheduling.  However, we demonstrate that 
training, operational commitments, and maintenance availabilities are explicitly linked.  
An optimal solution to aircraft carrier scheduling incorporates all these facets of carrier 
employment. 
In the past when carriers prepared for deployment to areas around the world using 
the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle, schedulers were concerned with area of 
responsibility (AOR) coverage.  The advent of the Fleet Response Plan removes the 
notion of AOR coverage, to some degree, and replaces it with a persistent readiness 
posture of the carrier fleet to respond to a variety of situations.  The results of this 
research demonstrate that both operational and maintenance planners can benefit from 
long-range, synchronous planning of all phases of the Fleet Readiness Training Plan to 
produce that readiness state.  Additionally, the feature we present to estimate carrier fleet 
spending provides a link between operational readiness and budget requirements.  
Considering the fiscal constraints now facing fleet planners, the decision-support 
optimization model presented here has much to offer. 
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APPENDIX A: OPTAR COST ANALYSIS 
A. LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
The test for significance of regression (or F test) is used to determine if a linear 
relationship exists between the response (dependent) variable and at least one of the 
predictor (independent) variables.  In general, the procedure is thought of as a global test 
of model adequacy.  Specifically, the procedure tests the following hypotheses: 
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Rejection of the null hypothesis in this test implies that at least one of the predictor 
variables contributes significantly to the regression model [e.g., Montgomery, et.al 2006, 
p. 80].  In statistical hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis is rejected when the calculated 
p-value is less than a user-defined level of significance.  The p-value is defined as the 
probability of obtaining a value of the test statistic, in this case the F ratio, at least as 
extreme as the one observed, given the null hypothesis is true. 
Once overall validity of the model is determined using the F test, the validity of 
individual predictor variables is determined using the t test that evaluates the contribution 
of each predictor to the regression model in the presence of the other predictors [e.g., 
Montgomery, et.al 2006, p. 84].  The t test examines the following hypotheses and is 













Finally, the coefficient of determination, or R2, is used to measure the variability 
of the response variable explained by the predictor variables.  The coefficient of 
determination takes values between zero and one, higher being better, indicating the 
proportion of the variability in the response explained by the regression model [e.g., 
Montgomery, et.al 2006, p. 35].  Evaluating a model’s validity by R2 alone is problematic 
because the statistic’s value can be inflated by including additional terms in the model.  
Therefore, the R2 statistic is considered only after the F and t tests prove significant. 
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B. FRTP PHASE COST MODEL 
1. Model Statistics 
The analysis of variance results (see Table 6) show the F-test of this model has a 
very low p-value indicating a linear relationship exists between total phase OPTAR cost 
and at least one of the independent variables.  A graphical representation of the test for 








Error F Ratio p-value 
Model 5 6.6285e+15 1.326e+15 65.3980 <.0001
Error 62 1.3176e+15 2.027e+13   
C. Total 67 7.9461e+15  
Table 6.   Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for FRTP Phase Cost Model 
Table 7 shows the estimates of the parameters in the linear regression model, and 
a t-test for each.  The p-values for the variables Fleet and Length are very low, indicating 
these parameters are contribute significantly to the overall model.  The high p-values for 
the levels of FRTP_Phase indicate these parameters are less significant in the overall 
model, and an additional test is required to determine the overall contribution of the 
FRTP_Phase variable. 
To confirm the variable FRTP_Phase does have an effect on the overall model, 
we calculate an effect test which evaluates the contribution of all parameters of a variable 
(see Table 8 below).  In this case, the p-values for each effect are very low indicating 
strong evidence that all three variables contribute significantly.  We can infer from this 
result that the fourth level of the FRTP_Phase variable not listed in Table 7 (for 








Error t Ratio p-value 
Intercept 2,791,729 1,242,610 2.25 0.0281
Fleet[Atlantic] 2,749,689 548,615 5.01 <0.0001
FRTP_Phase[Basic] -1,426,519 1,010,329 -1.41 0.1627
FRTP_Phase[Integrated] -1,748,213 1,202,502 -1.45 0.1508
FRTP_Phase[Maintenance] -1,403,757 932,592 -1.51 0.1371
Length (mths) 1,456,617 159,452 9.14 <.0001
Table 7.   Parameter Estimates and t-tests for FRTP Phase Cost Model 
This table displays the statistics to test the significance of each parameter in the linear 
regression model.  The t-ratio is the ratio of the parameter estimate to its standard error, 
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Figure 10.   Actual Phase Total Obligation versus Predicted Phase Total Obligation 
The confidence curves (dotted red diagonal lines) show a 95% confidence region for the 
line of fit (solid red diagonal line).  When the confidence curves do not contain the 
response sample mean (dotted blue horizontal line), as in this case, the effect of the 
model is significant.  The, R2 value of this regression model is 0.83 indicating 83% of the 








Squares F Ratio p-value 
Fleet 1 5.0923e+14 25.1207 <0.0001 
FRTP Phase 3 2.7127e+14 4.4607 0.0065 
Length (mths) 1 1.6917e+15 83.4511 <0.0001 
Table 8.   Effect Tests for FRTP Phase Cost Model 
This table displays the effect test statistics for each variable in the linear regression 
model.  The F ratio is the mean square error for the effect (defined as sum of squares 
divided by degrees of freedom) over mean square for error of the overall model (from 
Table 6).  Small p-values (less than 0.05) indicate the effect contributes significantly to 
the overall model. 
 
The final model diagnostic considered is the variance in the model residual 
values.  This is done by plotting the model residual values against predicted values.  One 
of the assumptions underpinning a linear regression model is the model residual values 
have equal variance, indicated by an even scatter of points above and below zero (blue 
horizontal line) in this plot.  Figure 11 shows a slight clustering of points close to zero on 
the horizontal axis indicating possible unequal variances.  This can be corrected by 
applying a power transformation to the response variable, typically by using the log or 
square-root functions.  In this case, however, transforming the response variable did not 













































Figure 11.   Model Residual Values vs. Model Predicted Values Plot 
An even distribution of points above and below the horizontal line plotted at zero on the 
y-axis indicates the sum of residual values is equal to zero, validating the assumption in 
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APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS OF OPTAR 
OBLIGATION AND EMPLOYMENT DATA 
A. DATA ORGANIZATION 
We attempt an additional investigation of monthly OPTAR spending to reveal 
potential relationships between schedule-driven factors and OPTAR spending.  
Obligations are categorized under 31 individual fund codes on the Budget OPTAR 
Report, and can be generally categorized by their respective Standard Identification Code 
(SIC) [NAVSO P-3013-2, App. II].  A summary analysis of OPTAR obligations by SIC 
in Figure 12 shows that SR and SO obligations comprise the vast majority (94% to 96%) 




Figure 12.   Comparison of Annual OPTAR Obligations 
 38
The graph above shows the percentage of total OPTAR spent in each Standard 
Identification Code (SIC) category by fiscal year.  The four SIC categories described are: 
SR for organizational level repair expenses, e.g., purchasing aviation and shipboard depot 
level repairable components and other equipment maintenance related material; SO for 
general use items and administrative supplies; SU for purchased utilities; and CT for 
counter-terrorism and force protection expenses.  In fiscal year 2003, for example, the 
carrier fleet spent $109.12M in SR, $177.75M in SO, and $13.44M in CT & SU 
combined (all in FY07$). 
B. LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY OPTAR 
OBLIGATIONS 
1. Discussion of Predictor Variables 
Possible predictor variables were developed through investigation of the data 
provided and discussions with both former aircraft carrier supply officers and officials at 
Commander Naval Air Forces familiar with OPTAR budget estimation.  A description of 
each is included here: 
• Airwing – true if the carrier’s airwing is embarked during any part of the 
month, false otherwise; 
• Month – a categorical variable corresponding to each month of the year [1-
12]; 
• Hull_Number – a categorical variable representing the carrier’s hull number 
[CV63, CV67, CVN65, CVN68-76]; 
• Fleet – a categorical variable representing the parent fleet of the carrier 
[Atlantic, Pacific]; 
• FRTP_Phase – a categorical variable representing the FRTP phase [basic, 
integrated, sustainment, maintenance]; 
• Phase_Detail – a categorical variable to provide specific maintenance type 
and deployment location [PIA, DPIA, RCOH, CENTCOM, WESTPAC, 
MED]; 
 39
• Month_Of_Maint – a numeric variable to count maintenance phase months 
sequentially starting at 1 for the first month, 0 for non-maintenance months; 
• POM_Month – true if observation immediately precedes a deployment, false 
otherwise; 
• Inspection – a categorical variable to represent significant inspections or 
evolutions observed in a month [TSTA, FEP, C2X, JTFEX, ORSE, 
INSURV]; 
• Last_Maint_Type – a categorical variable representing the last depot 
maintenance accomplished [PIA, DPIA, RCOH, NewConstruction]; 
• Next_Maint_Type - a categorical variable representing the next depot 
maintenance to be accomplished [PIA, DPIA, RCOH]; 
• Months_Till_Maint – a numeric variable for number of months until the next 
scheduled depot maintenance period, zero for maintenance period months; 
• Months_Since_Maint – a numeric variable for number of months since the last 
scheduled depot maintenance period, zero for maintenance period months; 
• Cycle_Month – a numeric variable to count the months in a FRTP cycle 
sequentially beginning with 1 for the first month of the cycle; 
• UW_Days – a numeric variable for number of days underway during the 
observed month; 
• Nbr_Port_Visits – a categorical variable for number of port visits observed in 
a month [0,1,2,3]; 
• Ship_Age_Mths – a numeric variable for the age of the carrier in months, 
calculated from commissioning month; and 
• Not_Maint – zero if observed month is during maintenance phase, one 
otherwise (when interacted with UW_Days variable will only consider 
underway days during non-maintenance months). 
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2. Analysis of All Observations 
Separate regression models generated for SR and SO monthly obligations pass the 
F test, and many of the variables mentioned previously are significant in each model 
according to t tests using a 0.05 level of significance.  However, we fail to achieve an R2 
value higher than 0.48 in either model indicating the chosen predictor variables explain 
only 48% of the total variability of SR and SO obligations. 
A regression model for the aggregated total of all SICs (SR + SO + SU + CT) as 
the response variable achieved only marginally better results (increased R2 from 0.48 to 
0.61), however, this analysis provided some insight into the interactions of the predictor 
variables.  Specifically, the predictor variables Month, Cycle_Month, Last_Maint_Type, 
Next_Maint_Type, Fleet, and UW_Days showed strong influence when interacted with 
the FRTP_Phase predictor variable, indicating that FRTP phase has some effect on 
monthly OPTAR spending. 
3. Analysis of Monthly OPTAR Obligations during Complete Fleet 
Readiness Training Program Cycles Only 
In an alternative approach, we analyzed only the observations during complete 
FRTP cycles.  Table 9 shows a summary of the seven carriers that completed a full FRTP 
cycle during the time period for which we have data.  Parsing the data in this manner 
provides an analysis of “steady state” operations, eliminating the observations from the 
early part of the data set when multiple carriers were underway operating in wartime 
conditions supporting both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
Additionally, applying the insight from earlier analyses, we developed separate 
regression models of total monthly OPTAR obligations for each of the four FRTP phases.  
Grouping the data in this way delivered substantially better results.  Complete results for 
each model are included later in this chapter, and are summarized in Table 10.  Predictor 
variables for each linear regression model were chosen based on their individual t-tests.  
The log transformation of the response variable was used where applicable to ensure 
homoscedasticity of the model residual values.  The subset of complete FRTP cycles 
contained only 12 observations of integrated phase months, and a statistically significant 
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model could not be generated on these observations alone, therefore, basic and integrated 
phase observations were analyzed together. 
 
Months in FRTP Phase 
Ship Fleet Basic Integrated Sustainment Maintenance Total 
CVN 65 Atlantic 4 1 11 13 29 
CVN 68 Pacific 4 1 13 6 24 
CVN 71 Atlantic 2 1 12 10 25 
CVN 72 Pacific 3 2 22 10 37 
CVN 73 Atlantic 6 1 11 11 29 
CVN 74 Pacific 8 4 12 10 34 
CVN 75 Atlantic 5 2 16 12 35 
Average --- 4.57 1.71 13.86 10.29 30.43 
Table 9.   Complete FRTP Cycles, Fiscal Years 2003-2007 
This table shows the seven instances of a carrier completing a full FRTP cycle during the 
time period for which we have data.  For example, CVN65 spend 4 months in basic 
phase, 1 month in integrated phase, 11 months in sustainment phase, 13 months in 
maintenance phase for a total cycle length of 29 months. 
 
Phase Model Parameters 




log(Total_Obligation) ~ Intercept + Month + 
Fleet + Airwing + Month:Fleet + Airwing:Fleet 
F statistic = 4.096 
p-value = 0.002 0.86 
Sustainment log(Total_Obligation) ~ Intercept + Month + 
Fleet + POM_Month + Cycle_Month + 
Cycle_Month:POM_Month + Cycle_Month:Fleet 
F statistic = 7.012 
p-value = <0.0001 0.75 
Maintenance Total_Obligation ~ Intercept + Month + 
Month_Of_Maint + Cycle_Month + 
Month:Month_Of_Maint + Month:Cycle_Month 
F statistic = 14.689 
p-value = <0.0001 0.93 
Deployment Total_Obligation ~ Intercept + Month + 
Phase_Detail 
F statistic = 6.331 
p-value = <0.0001 0.74 
Table 10.   Linear Regression Analysis of Total OPTAR Obligations by FRTP Phase 
This table shows a summary of the linear regression analysis performed for OPTAR 
obligations separated by FRTP phase type.  All pass the F test (test for significance of 
regression) with very low p-values.  R2 values range from 0.74 (for deployment months) 
to 0.93 (for maintenance phase months). 
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C. LINEAR REGRESSION DETAILS 
1. Basic and Integrated Phase Model 
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom Sum of Squares Mean Square Error F Ratio p-value 
Model 25 20.122649 0.804906 4.0959 0.0020
Error 17 3.340745 0.196514  
C. Total 42 23.463394  
Table 11.   Analysis of Variance (Basic-and-Integrated Phase Model) 
The analysis of variance results show the F-test of this model has a very low p-value 
(0.002) indicating a linear relationship exists between the response (dependent variable) 
and at least one of the predictors (independent variables). 
 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio p-value 
Intercept 14.165677 0.089809 157.73 <.0001
Month[1] -0.371151 0.264691 -1.40 0.1789
Month[2] -0.42576 0.269956 -1.58 0.1332
Month[3] 0.4160488 0.311334 1.34 0.1990
Month[4] -0.081434 0.311334 -0.26 0.7968
Month[5] -0.187217 0.264691 -0.71 0.4890
Month[6] -0.19276 0.228923 -0.84 0.4115
Month[7] 0.3575921 0.276511 1.29 0.2132
Month[8] 0.3534696 0.228923 1.54 0.1410
Month[9] 0.9357826 0.264484 3.54 0.0025
Month[10] -0.308289 0.293152 -1.05 0.3077
Month[11] -0.102246 0.250136 -0.41 0.6878
Fleet[Atlantic] 0.4409769 0.089809 4.91 0.0001
Airwing[F] -0.226355 0.123018 -1.84 0.0833
Month[1]*Fleet[Atlantic] 0.2444043 0.264691 0.92 0.3687
Month[2]*Fleet[Atlantic] -0.090697 0.269956 -0.34 0.7410
Month[3]*Fleet[Atlantic] 0.8419102 0.311334 2.70 0.0150
Month[4]*Fleet[Atlantic] 0.4175941 0.311334 1.34 0.1975
Month[5]*Fleet[Atlantic] 0.224502 0.264691 0.85 0.4081
Month[6]*Fleet[Atlantic] -0.176531 0.228923 -0.77 0.4512
Month[7]*Fleet[Atlantic] 0.3007165 0.276511 1.09 0.2920
Month[8]*Fleet[Atlantic] -0.659902 0.228923 -2.88 0.0103
Month[9]*Fleet[Atlantic] -0.077273 0.264484 -0.29 0.7737
Month[10]*Fleet[Atlantic] -0.600674 0.293152 -2.05 0.0562
Month[11]*Fleet[Atlantic] -0.51125 0.250136 -2.04 0.0568
Fleet[Atlantic]*Airwing[F] -0.436475 0.123018 -3.55 0.0025
Table 12.   Parameter Estimates (Basic-and-Integrated Phase Model) 
This table displays the statistics to test the significance of each parameter in the linear 
regression model for basic-and-integrated phase months.  In this analysis, we assume a 
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Figure 13.   Actual versus Predicted Plot (Basic & Integrated Phase Model) 
The solid red diagonal line is the fit with the predicted response of the whole model along 
the x-axis and actual values along the y-axis.  In this case, the line of fit crosses the 
response sample mean (solid blue horizontal line) indicating the effect of the whole 
model is significant.  The, R2 value of this regression model is 0.86 indicating 86% of the 
variability in the response (Total Obligations) is explained by the linear regression model. 
2. Sustainment Phase Model 
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom Sum of Squares Mean Square Error F Ratio p-value 
Model 16 19.082883 1.19268 7.0115 <.0001
Error 37 6.293785 0.17010  
C. Total 53 25.376668  
Table 13.   Analysis of Variance (Sustainment Phase Model) 
The analysis of variance results show the F-test of this model has a very low p-value 
(<0.0001) indicating a linear relationship exists between the response (dependent 








Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio p-value 
Intercept 14.412676 0.229773 62.73 <.0001
Month[1] -0.226971 0.171393 -1.32 0.1935
Month[2] 0.2359395 0.250879 0.94 0.3531
Month[3] 0.00652 0.214846 0.03 0.9760
Month[4] -0.008038 0.20599 -0.04 0.9691
Month[5] 0.0300478 0.208539 0.14 0.8862
Month[6] 0.4394658 0.202427 2.17 0.0364
Month[7] 0.0744153 0.189563 0.39 0.6969
Month[8] -0.349712 0.171232 -2.04 0.0483
Month[9] 1.0151306 0.186137 5.45 <.0001
Month[10] -0.245974 0.208913 -1.18 0.2466
Month[11] -0.401206 0.1921 -2.09 0.0437
Fleet[Atlantic] 0.1816021 0.068309 2.66 0.0115
POM_Month[0] 0.331436 0.081121 4.09 0.0002
Cycle_Month -0.042635 0.016759 -2.54 0.0153
POM_Month[0]*(Cycle_Month-13.5556) 0.0396967 0.017342 2.29 0.0279
Fleet[Atlantic]*(Cycle_Month-13.5556) -0.036984 0.014988 -2.47 0.0184
Table 14.   Parameter Estimates (Sustainment Phase Model) 
This table displays the statistics to test the significance of each parameter in the linear 
regression model for sustainment phase months.  In this analysis, we assume a predictor 
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Figure 14.   Actual versus Predicted Plot (Sustainment Phase Model) 
The solid red diagonal line is the fit with the predicted response of the whole model along 
the x-axis and actual values along the y-axis.  In this case, the line of fit crosses the 
response sample mean (solid blue horizontal line) indicating the effect of the whole 
model is significant.  The, R2 value of this regression model is 0.75 indicating 75% of the 
variability in the response (Total Obligations) is explained by the linear regression model. 
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3. Maintenance Phase Model 
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom Sum of Squares Mean Square Error F Ratio p-value 
Model 35 9.096e+13 2.599e+12 14.6892 <.0001
Error 36 6.3693e+12 1.769e+11  
C. Total 71 9.733e+13  
Table 15.   Analysis of Variance (Maintenance Phase Model) 
The analysis of variance results show the F-test of this model has a very low p-value 
(<0.0001) indicating a linear relationship exists between the response (dependent 
variable) and at least one of the predictors (independent variables). 
 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio p-value
Intercept 1354873.8 296582.5 4.57 <.0001
Month[1] -992293 349096.7 -2.84 0.0073
Month[2] 380036.54 275030.1 1.38 0.1755
Month[3] -257724.7 223898.9 -1.15 0.2573
Month[4] 65012.952 184168.6 0.35 0.7261
Month[5] -256989.8 161718.3 -1.59 0.1208
Month[6] -232931.3 163813.7 -1.42 0.1637
Month[7] -396007.3 190678.1 -2.08 0.0450
Month[8] -69155.21 233579.4 -0.30 0.7689
Month[9] 2670870.3 163475.8 16.34 <.0001
Month[10] -345235.3 176893.1 -1.95 0.0588
Month[11] -459402 194234.7 -2.37 0.0235
Month_Of_Maint 114804.89 25123.15 4.57 <.0001
Cycle_Month -32162.41 12694.21 -2.53 0.0158
Month[1]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) -380782.7 124118 -3.07 0.0041
Month[2]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) 107219.18 89459.44 1.20 0.2385
Month[3]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) -96528.01 86188.01 -1.12 0.2701
Month[4]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) 106754.32 86188.01 1.24 0.2235
Month[5]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) -79409.4 86188.01 -0.92 0.3630
Month[6]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) -70670.46 86188.01 -0.82 0.4176
Month[7]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) -100407.9 88432.48 -1.14 0.2637
Month[8]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) 223752.05 88432.48 2.53 0.0159
Month[9]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) 324390.95 49417.2 6.56 <.0001
Month[10]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) -34126.82 60060.48 -0.57 0.5734
Month[11]*(Month_Of_Maint-5.84722) 52499.125 60060.48 0.87 0.3879
Month[1]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) 74401.306 50971.64 1.46 0.1531
Month[2]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) -26487.37 38372.86 -0.69 0.4945
Month[3]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) 26732.232 38180.08 0.70 0.4883
Month[4]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) 14613.935 38180.08 0.38 0.7041
Month[5]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) 91928.157 38180.08 2.41 0.0213
Month[6]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) 13152.987 38180.08 0.34 0.7325
Month[7]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) -30513.3 49785.34 -0.61 0.5438
Month[8]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) -43752.65 49785.34 -0.88 0.3853
Month[9]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) -235151.1 37073.4 -6.34 <.0001
Month[10]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) 51131.758 37896.98 1.35 0.1857
Month[11]*(Cycle_Month-25.9861) -28058.72 37896.98 -0.74 0.4639
Table 16.   Parameter Estimates (Maintenance Phase Model) 
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This table displays the statistics to test the significance of each parameter in the linear 
regression model for maintenance phase months.  In this analysis, we assume a predictor 
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Figure 15.   Actual versus Predicted Plot (Maintenance Phase Model) 
The confidence curves (dotted red diagonal lines) show a 95% confidence region for the 
line of fit (solid red diagonal line).  When the confidence curves do not contain the 
response sample mean (dotted blue horizontal line), as in this case, the effect of the 
model is significant.  The, R2 value of this regression model is 0.93 indicating 93% of the 
variability in the response (Total Obligations) is explained by the linear regression model. 
4. Deployment Model 
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom Sum of Squares Mean Square Error F Ratio p-value 
Model 13 2.5751e+13 1.981e+12 6.3305 <.0001
Error 29 9.0741e+12 3.129e+11  
C. Total 42 3.4825e+13  
Table 17.   Analysis of Variance (Deployment Model) 
The analysis of variance results show the F-test of this model has a very low p-value 
(<0.0001) indicating a linear relationship exists between the response (dependent 





Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio p-value
Intercept 2506566.9 119959.9 20.90 <.0001
Month[1] -532765.3 308784.3 -1.73 0.0951
Month[2] -393490.8 248799.2 -1.58 0.1246
Month[3] 157965 275667.2 0.57 0.5710
Month[4] 461835.44 275667.2 1.68 0.1046
Month[5] -517745.3 275667.2 -1.88 0.0704
Month[6] 337873.85 271949.9 1.24 0.2240
Month[7] -690760 271949.9 -2.54 0.0167
Month[8] -621981.3 313096 -1.99 0.0565
Month[9] 2163810.2 373020.9 5.80 <.0001
Month[10] -200607.2 272398.9 -0.74 0.4674
Month[11] -463509.1 308784.3 -1.50 0.1441
Phase_Detail[CENTCOM] 92610.107 135260.7 0.68 0.4990
Phase_Detail[MED] 628343.56 214862.5 2.92 0.0066
Table 18.   Parameter Estimates (Deployment Model) 
This table displays the statistics to test the significance of each parameter in the linear 
regression model for deployment months.  In this analysis, we assume a predictor 
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Figure 16.   Actual versus Predicted Plot (Deployment Model) 
The confidence curves (dotted red diagonal lines) show a 95% confidence region for the 
line of fit (solid red diagonal line).  When the confidence curves do not contain the 
response sample mean (dotted blue horizontal line), as in this case, the effect of the 
model is significant.  The, R2 value of this regression model is 0.74 indicating 74% of the 
variability in the response (Total Obligations) is explained by the linear regression model. 
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APPENDIX C: CV/CVN AVAILABILITY SCHEDULE 
From: Naval Sea Systems Command carrier maintenance planning activity, 1 May 2008 
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